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ABSTRACT
This paper adresses the impact of trust on private equity contracts. Trust between
investor and entrepreneur is essential to help overcome control problems, especially in
an environment with severe agency risks and incomplete contracts. In this study,
information about the effects of trust is collected using a simulation with 144
entrepreneurs and investors. We find that trust has an impact on the desired contracts of
entrepreneurs, but not on that of investors. Our findings suggest that for parties, faced
with potentially large agency problems (investors), trust and control seem to play
complementary roles. On the other hand, for parties faced with smaller agency problems
(entrepreneurs), trust seems to be a substitute for control.
4INTRODUCTION
The venture capital industry is characterized by large information asymmetries and high
levels of uncertainty on the one hand (Amit, Glosten & Muller, 1990; Chan, Siegel &
Thakor, 1990) and exceptional opportunities on the other. Private equity investors,
however, are faced with significant agency problems when investing in a private
venture.  In order to mitigate potential agency problems between entrepreneurs and
outside investors, parties (investors as well as entrepreneurs) will screen one another
before investing, write contracts detailing specific rights of both parties, and investors
will monitor the venture after the investment (Manigart & Sapienza, 1999).  The goal of
the contract is to allocate cash flow rights between entrepreneurs and investors and to
give control rights to both parties, such as voting rights, board rights, liquidation rights
and the provision of future financing (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2000).  Although the
allocation of cash flow rights can be structured to provide incentives for the
entrepreneur to behave optimally, the contract is especially important when business
activities are not developing as favorably as expected (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2000;
Sahlman, 1990).
Recent research has begun to study the content and the structure of the investment
contract between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs (e.g. Gompers, 1998; Kaplan &
Strömberg, 2000; Landström, Manigart, Mason & Sapienza, 1998; Sahlman, 1990) and
to shed light on factors that might enhance how contracts are written. However, in a
complex, long term relationship, such as that between an entrepreneur and a venture
5capitalist (Cable & Shane, 1997; Sapienza, Korsgaard, Folger, Sagrera & Zhang, 1999),
it is impossible to negotiate and explain every single future contingency in a formal
document (Landström et al., 1998): contracts are always incomplete. Moreover,
imposing too many conditions and reporting requirements infringes upon managers’
desire to feel in control (Sapienza, 1989) and may be interpreted by them as a signal of
distrust (Kelly, 2000). Importantly, then, the pre-investment screening and negotiation
process represents a critical transition from due diligence to post-investment interaction;
the nature of the process by which this transition is secured may be critical to the quality
of the interactions that follow (Cable & Shane, 1997; Sapienza et al., 1999). Trust helps
facilitate collaboration (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Smith, Carrol & Ashford,
1995), reduces agency and transaction costs (Jones, 1995), and improves a firm’s ability
to adapt to complexity and ambiguity (Korsgaard, Schweiger & Sapienza, 1995).
In an environment with severe agency risks and incomplete contracts, trust between
both parties is essential to help overcome control problems (Dasgupta, 1988). However,
there is a debate in the literature on the nature of the relationship between trust and
control (Das & Teng, 1998). On the one hand, it is argued that trust and control may be
viewed as substitutes. Formal legal contractual agreements (control) and psychological
contracts (trust) may be substitutes in interfirm cooperation (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).
On the other hand, Das and Teng (1998: 496) argue that “a higher trust level does not
automatically dictate a lowering of the control level, and vice versa.” There is need of a
minimum level of both trust and control in order to have confidence in a partner. Both
trust and control play therefore different roles in a partner relationship.
6Recent studies have emphasized the importance of trust in the relationship between
investors and the firms in which they invest (Harrison, Dibben & Mason, 1997;
Saparito, 2000; Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996), and some have argued that trust can have
substantive direct effects on contract provisions (Sapienza et al., 1999).  However, little
empirical work has examined how trust develops or how it affects investor-entrepreneur
exchanges and contracts. Therefore, in this paper we conduct an experiment in order to
focus closely on the relationship between trust and contractual agreements.
THE IMPACT OF TRUST ON PRIVATE EQUITY CONTRACTS
In the view that trust and control are substitutes, trust implies the exclusion of deliberate
control over the behavior of others. When it is possible to fully trust a partner, there is
no need to control the partner’s behavior. Control comes into play only when adequate
trust is not present. Monitoring and controlling a venture is time-consuming for the
investor (Gifford, 1997), however, and therefore costly.  Investors will be willing to
diminish deliberate control only if they trust entrepreneurs to behave in their best
interests.  Therefore, in this view, it is argued that the more the investor trusts the
entrepreneur, the lower will be the number of contractual clauses in the contract.
In the venture capital – entrepreneur relationship, both parties are vulnerable to each
other in that reaching their goals requires cooperation from the other party, yet they may
have goals that differ from those of the other party (Cable & Shane, 1997; Sapienza &
7Korsgaard, 1996). Given this vulnerability, both entrepreneur and investor may be
motivated to protect themselves by constructing more elaborate investment contracts
with more protective clauses (Kelly, 2000; Manigart & Sapienza, 1999). However,
given that the administration and enforcement of contract provisions is costly, both
parties should be willing to have a less elaborate contract if they believe in the good will
of the other party.  Therefore trust should make both parties more willing to omit self-
protecting and generally negotiate a less elaborate contract.  The foregoing arguments
lead to following hypotheses :
Hypothesis 1: A higher level of trust between entrepreneurs and investors will lead to
fewer contractual clauses in the investment contract.
Hypothesis 2: A higher level of trust of one party towards the other will lead to fewer
contractual clauses in the investment contract that protect that party against harmful
actions of the other party.
RESEARCH METHOD AND SAMPLE
Given the proprietary nature of private equity deals, information about private equity
investment contracts between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and the preceding
negotiation process is scarce (Barry, 1994; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2000). In this study,
information about the effects of the negotiation process on the investment decision and
on the mutual trust between entrepreneur and investor was collected using a simulation
8designed to manipulate the ex-ante trust between the two parties. We measured trust
perceptions and contract term preferences at various points in the negotiation process.
The experiment was conducted with 144 entrepreneurs and investors, predominantly
males, in the context of training sessions at a leading Belgian business school. Of the 68
participants who received a high trust manipulation, we obtained valid observations for
56 participants. Of the 76 participants who received a low trust manipulation, 46
observations were valid. Both in the high trust and the low trust situation, approximately
half of the participants took the role of entrepreneur, the other half took the role of
investor.
High versus low trust was manipulated by having participants “play” a prisoner’s
dilemma-type game before the negotiation session.  Participants were given false
feedback on the results of the game that indicated that their counterpart acted in either a
trustworthy or untrustworthy manner. Participants then completed a four-item scale
measuring their trust in their counterpart.  A sample item is “I feel this person can be
counted on to help me.” Items were rated on a scale from 1, “strongly disagree”, to 5,
“strongly agree” and averaged to form an overall index of trust (Cronbach α= 0.84).
Participants were then randomly assigned either an “investor” scenario or an
“entrepreneur” scenario.  The scenario involved a case of a start-up venture, based on a
real company: a young entrepreneur is looking for venture capital for his early stage
internet company. He finds a venture capitalist who is willing to invest a fixed amount
9of money in the company in exchange for 49% of the company’s shares. The
participants were given a list of potential contract provisions and instructed to set their
“goals” for their ideal contract.  We created five measures from participants’ choices:
the total number of contract provisions, the absolute number of Pro-investor contract
provisions, the absolute number of Pro-entrepreneur provisions, the percent of Pro-
investor contract provisions, and the percentage of Pro-entrepreneur contract provisions.
Insert table 1 about here
Fourteen contract clauses, frequently used in venture capital contracts (Kaplan &
Strömberg, 2000; Landström et al., 1998) were presented as possible choices to be
included in the subjects’ “ideal” contract. Participants were asked to decide which (if
any) of these clauses they would include.  Table 1 describes the 14 contract clauses.
Two types of contract provisions can be included in the contract: terms that are
favorable for the investor (so-called Pro-investor clauses) and terms that are favorable
for the entrepreneur (so-called Pro-entrepreneur clauses). Because Pro-investor clauses
are most common, we included 10 such choices; three Pro-entrepreneur choices were
included; and, one clause provided protection to both investors and entrepreneurs. In
recognition of the real-world costs of writing and enforcing contract provisions, we
imposed a “cost” of 2,500 EURO per clause included in the contract.
After proposing an ideal contract, participants had the opportunity to go through several
rounds of negotiating the contract and finalize a mutually agreed upon contract.
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RESULTS
The effects of the manipulation of trust on trust perception were tested. Participants had
an average trust perception of 3.45 (standard deviation=0.99). The manipulation of trust
resulted in significantly different trust perceptions, with participants in the high trust
condition reporting significantly greater trust in their counterpart (high trust, x = 3.77;
low trust, x = 3.06; p<0.01). This finding indicates that the manipulation was
successful.
Insert table 2 about here
Consistent with our hypotheses, the manipulation of trust resulted in significantly
different contract preferences for entrepreneurs, as shown in Table 2.  However,
contrary to our expectations, trust leads entrepreneurs to include significantly more
clauses in their ideal contract. This difference is largely explained by entrepreneurs’
preferences regarding Pro-investor clauses: entrepreneurs in the high trust condition
specified significantly more Pro-investor clauses than did entrepreneurs in the low trust
condition. This finding, while not explicitly hypothesized, is consistent with our
thinking, for it suggests that entrepreneurs who trust the investor are more willing to
allow for contract provisions that are advantageous to the investor.  Trust did not have a
significant impact on entrepreneurs’ preferences for Pro Entrepreneur clauses.  For the
investors the effects of the trust manipulation on the contract measures were not
significant.
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Insert table 3 about here
To further explore these hypotheses, we examined the relationship between trust
perceptions and contract terms. The correlations between trust perceptions and contract
measures are reported separately for each party in Table 3.  Trust perceptions were not
related to the total number of clauses proposed by either party. However, there is some
evidence that trust is related to the percentage of proposed provisions that are protective.
Specifically, for entrepreneurs, trust was positively associated with percentage of
proposed provisions that were favorable to the investor, and negatively associated with
proposed provisions that were favorable to the entrepreneur. These findings provide
limited support for Hypothesis 2. However, investors’ trust was not associated with
their choice of contract provisions.
Insert table 4 about here
In supplemental analyses, we examined the relationship between trust perceptions and
the clauses in the mutually agreed upon final contract, the results of which are reported
in Table 4. For investors the effects of the trust perception on the contract measures in
the final contract were not significant, consistent with the findings of the initial
contracts. Also consistent with previous findings is that the trust perception of
entrepreneurs was negatively related with the % of Pro-Investor clauses. The
relationship between Trust Perception and the % of Pro-Investor clauses in the final
contract, however, was negative, contrary to the findings in the initial contract.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have found in this experimental setting that trust has an impact on the desired
contracts of entrepreneurs, but not on that of investors.   The number of contractual
clauses that investors wanted to include in their ideal contract appeared to be
independent of their level of trust or distrust of the entrepreneur.  Trusting the
entrepreneur did not appeart to influence their desire for legal protection.  Thus, the
findings suggests that trust may not be a substitute for legal contracts and monitoring
options, but trust and control play rather complementary roles, supporting Das and Teng
(1998).
In contrast, trust signficantly affected entrepreneurs’ contract preferences.
Entrepreneurs in the high trust condition appeared to prefer a more elaborate contract.
However, the findings regarding Pro-investor clauses explains this surprising result:
entrepreneurs were willing to give up control over investors when the trust was high,
supporting the view that trust and control are substitutes (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).
Moreover, a higher level of trust induced entrepreneurs to accept higher level of control
of the investor.
In including more favorable terms for the investors, entrepreneurs may moreover send a
strong signal to investors that they accept outside control, and thus that the potential
moral hazard problem is small.  This, in turn, is likely to increase the trust that investors
have in the entrepreneurs. One aspect of this phenomenon, however, that we are unable
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to examine is the long-term effect on entrepreneurs’ attitudes that such contractual
“sacrifices” might have.  In agency theory terms, this giving up of rights/ protection
could be seen as a bonding or signaling cost that entrepreneurs are willing to submit to
in order to secure the investment.  Equity theory, however, suggests that such actions, if
not reciprocated in some observable ways by investors later on, may lead to a
deterioration of the exchange relationship.  That is, if entrepreneurs knowingly sacrifice
some benefits to themselves for the sake of the relationship, they will expect to be
treated in kind at some point.  They may later on believe that they have given too much
and gotten too little in return for their gestures of trust, especially if they are not treated
in like manner by their investors when the opportunities arise.  If this were to happen,
then they would likely retaliate by withholding effort or information, exactly the
opposite effects of what investors want (Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996).
The relationship between trust and control is clearly a complex relationship.  For
parties, faced with potentially large agency problems (investors), trust and control seem
to play complementary roles.  On the other hand, for parties faced with smaller agency
problems (entrepreneurs), trust seems to be a substitute for control.
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TABLES
TABLE 1
Description of contract provisions
Nr Description Pro …
1 Ratchet down agreement. Failure to meet performance targets within
a specified period results in a pre-agreed reduction in the
entrepreneur’s equity share.
Investor
2 Ratchet up agreement. Meeting certain performance targets within a
specified period results in a pre-agreed increase in the entrepreneur’s
equity share of the venture.
Entrep.
3 Board Control over Hiring of Senior Personnel. Provides investors
with the right to oversee and approve hiring of senior management
personnel.
Investor
4 Investor veto rights over acquisition and divestiture. Provides
investors with the right to prevent undesired changes in the business
structure of the venture.
Investor
5 Agreement on frequency of board meetings.  Specifies the number of
board meetings to be held and requires investor attendance as board
member.
Entrep.
6 Agreement on completeness, timeliness, and accuracy of information
provided to board. Provides investors with guarantee of complete
financial and market reports in a complete, timely manner prior to
board meetings.
Investor
7 Board approval of budgets and plans.  Provides investors with say in
setting strategic direction of venture.
Investor
8 Secrecy agreement. Entrepreneur agrees not to reveal identity of
potential investor or potential terms of offer to any outside parties.
Investor
9 Pre-agreed valuation formula. A pre-specified formula for
calculating the value of the venture.
Investor
Entrep.
10 Patent rights ownership. This term protects the entrepreneur from
loss of value of proprietary patent.
Entrep.
11 Stock vesting agreement. This term requires that significant portions
of the entrepreneur’s equity does not vest or “kick in” until the
entrepreneur has remained with the venture for a significant period
of time.
Investor
12 Investor control of the board. This term structures the board so that
the investors control the chair and the majority of the board seats.
Investor
13 Board right of managerial dismissal.  This term gives the board the
right to fire the lead entrepreneur or other member of the
entrepreneurial team for violations of ethics and honesty.
Investor
14 Non-compete clause.  This term provides sanctions against top
managers who leave the venture and attempt to compete directly
against the venture, whether unethically using contacts/ knowledge/
or resources obtained from the venture or not.
Investor
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TABLE 2
Effects of trust manipulation (“ideal contract”)
Entrepreneur (N=49) Investor (N=53)
Variable High
Trust
(N=27)
Low Trust
(N=22)
High
Trust
(N=29)
Low
Trust
(N=24)
Trust Perception Mean 3.81 3.05** 3.73 3.07**
S.D. (0.92) (1.19) (0.62) (1.00)
Total # of Clauses Mean 5.74 4.59* 6.86 6.42
S.D. (2.44) (2.13) (2.55) (1.93)
# Pro-entrepreneur
Clauses
Mean 2.07 1.82 1.03 0.96
S.D. (0.92) (0.66) (0.87) (0.81)
# Pro-investor Clauses Mean 2.89 2.05 † 5.21 4.79
S.D. (2.03) (1.79) (2.09) (1.77)
% Pro-entrepreneur
Clauses
Mean 0.38 0.45 0.15 0.16
S.D. (0.19) (0.22) (0.14) (0.13)
% Pro-investor Clauses Mean 0.45 0.37 (a) 0.75 0.74
S.D. (0.24) (0.24) (0.15) (0.17)
S.D.: standard deviation
Significance level of t-test for independent samples
(a) p=0.10;
† p<0.1
* p<.05
** p<0.01
(1-sided)
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TABLE 3
Correlation between Trust Perception and dependent variables ( “ideal” contract)
Entrepreneur
(N=49)
Investor
(N=53)
Dependent Variable Correlation Correlation
Total # of Clauses 0.15 0.12
# Pro-entrepreneur Clauses 0.06 0.07
# Pro-investor Clauses 0.17 0.09
% Pro-entrepreneur Clauses -0.22 † 0.02
% Pro-investor Clauses    0.31* -0.03
† p<0.1
* p<.05
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TABLE 4
Correlation between Trust Perception and dependent variables (mutually agreed upon
final contract)
Entrepreneur (N=42) (a) Investor (N=46)
(a)
Dependent Variable Correlation Correlation
Total # of Clauses -0.06 0.15
 # Pro-entrepreneur Clauses -0.11 0.02
# Pro-investor Clauses -0.02 0.15
% Pro-entrepreneur Clauses -0.24* -0.06
% Pro-investor Clauses -0.22 † 0.05
(a)A few participants did not come to an agreement.
† p<0.1
* p<.05
(1-sided)
Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School
WORKING PAPER SERIES
2001/1 VERWEIRE, K., and L. VAN DEN BERGHE, The performance consequences
of diversification in the financial services industry: the case of financial
conglomeration in Belgium and the Netherlands. (48 pp.)
2001/2 BUYENS, D., and A. DE VOS, Adding value through integration and
involvement: a qualitative study about management ‘s perception of the
added value of the HR function. (46 pp.)
2001/3 VEREECKE, A., R. VAN DIERDONCK, and A. DE MEYER, A network
typology of plants in global manufacturing networks. (33 pp.)
2001/4 VAN POUCKE, D., and M. BUELENS, Predicting the negotiated outcome:
the role of the structural reference points and negotiator’s ‘offer zone’.
(27 pp.)
2001/5 BUELENS, M., and D. VAN POUCKE, Determinants of negiotatiors’s initial
offer. (27 pp.)
2001/6 OOGHE, H., and V. DE VUYST, The Anglo-Saxon versus the Continental
European governance model: empirical evidence of board composition in
Belgium. (42 pp.)
2001/7 SLEUWAEGEN, L., and I. DE VOLDERE, Globalisation and the definition of
the relevant geographic market in antitrust practice. (38 pp.)
2001/8 VEREECKE, A., and R. VAN DIERDONCK, The strategic role of the plant:
testing Ferdows’ model. (44 pp.)
2001/9 OOGHE, H., J. CAMERLYNCK and S. BALCAEN, The Ooghe-Joos-De Vos
failure prediction models: a cross-industry validation. (61 pp.)
2001/10 OOGHE, H., and J. CAMERLYNCK, Pre-acquisition profile of privately held
companies involved in takeovers: an empirical study (57 pp.)
2002/1 MANIGART, S., M. A. KORSGAARD, R. FOLGER, H. J. SAPIENZA and K.
BAEYENS, The impact of trust on private equity contracts. (21 pp.)
2002/2 DE WULF, K., G. ODEKERKEN-SCHRÖDER, M.H. DE CANNIÈRE and C.
VAN OPPEN, What drives consumer participation to loyalty programs? A
conjoint analytical approach. (25 pp.)
Contact:
Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School
Bellevue 6
B-9050 Ghent
++32 9 210 97 27 (T)  ++32 9 210 97 47 (F)  www.vlerick.be  library@vlerick.be
